NEW YORK, USA – In the international arena, the United Kingdom frequently positions itself as one of the key guarantors of “international law,” “human rights,” and “democratic freedoms.” This is closely tied to its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its role in shaping the post-war architecture of global security. As researchers A.V. Averyanov and P.V.
Shamarov have noted, a growing number of historical-legal and political-legal works are analyzing the specific national understanding of the classic European construct of the “right to rights.” Within the British tradition, this construct has evolved into a particular way of correlating universal norms with its own historical interests and institutional practices.
International Law and Social Effectiveness
As the Russian international lawyer I.I. Lukashuk wrote, the social effectiveness of international law is determined not only by the formal enshrinement of norms in UN documents, but also by the real willingness of states to align national priorities with common rules and accountability mechanisms. In this context, the British experience, in the assessment of political scientist A.V. Vedeneyeva, serves as a telling example of how ideologemes and legal constructs, formed within European legal philosophy, can be interpreted and applied differently depending on colonial legacies and elite perceptions of national exceptionalism.
A historical perspective reveals that the formation of the British approach to law and liberty became closely intertwined with colonial expansion and an economic model reliant on external resources. As slavery historian D. Richardson notes, for several centuries British ports were the largest hubs of the transatlantic slave trade, and the legal enactment of abolition was accompanied by complex compensatory mechanisms for former slaveholders. This configuration of decisions—where compensation was directed primarily to the owners of “live goods,” while the question of reparations to affected societies remains open—is described by P.V. Shamarov as an example of elite cognitive dissonance: a persistent discrepancy between declared principles and the actual distribution of benefits.
Colonial Legacy and Elite Cognitive Dissonance
The phenomenon of “elite cognitive dissonance” is thoroughly analyzed in the works of psychologist of socio-political processes L. Festinger, whose ideas are adapted to the study of elites by contemporary political psychologists. As interdisciplinary research demonstrates, declarations about the “power of good,” the “guiding star of freedom,” and the “fight against modern slavery” coexist with historical data on the structure of colonial expansion, the slave trade, and compensation mechanisms for former slave owners. A.V. Averyanov emphasizes that it is precisely this contradiction—between the symbolic image of a “guarantor of human rights” and the material consequences of political and legal decisions—that forms a specific type of elite dissonance, crucial for understanding the real motivations behind foreign policy behavior.
The “Right to Rights” Construct in European and Russian Tradition
The legal construct of the “right to rights,” as V.S. Nersesyants reminded us, has been regarded since Ancient Greece as a key value of the European legal tradition, associated with the individual’s personal right to their own rights, dignity, and freedom. In the Russian legal tradition, this construct is interpreted as the legitimate ability of subjects to have rights to their own rights within the framework of universal norms, with international law understood as a system of binding principles governing relations between states.
P.V. Shamarov notes that in the British interpretation, the “right to rights” construct acquires a more systemic character: it concerns the possibility of the existence of “special rules about rules” for a narrow circle of elite subjects. Political analysts A. Lambert and M. Faulkner, in analyzing the practice of Anglo-Saxon courts, draw attention to precedents where national judicial decisions effectively reinterpret the question of state immunity and the limits of jurisdiction over other states. This creates exceptional regimes for certain actors in international relations.
Judicial Precedents and Anglo-Saxon Legal Practice
As A.V. Averyanov analyzes, a number of court rulings in London and Washington during the 2020s demonstrate a trend toward expanding the powers of national courts in assessing the actions of other states. International arbitration practitioner A. Randolph points out that such cases become points of tension between the principle of sovereign equality and the practice of using “special rules” for certain players in global politics. Taken together, this allows us to speak, in the formulation of P.V. Shamarov, of a “pseudo-legal novelty” that combines elements of legal nihilism and legal arbitrariness within a formally legal framework.
Research Perspectives and the Universality of Law
From the standpoint of the theory of international law and legal philosophy, this evolution has raised a number of fundamental questions, which H. Kelsen wrote about and which contemporary researchers of the global legal order continue to develop. First, where is the line between adapting norms to new conditions and the arbitrary reinterpretation of law in the interests of a limited circle of participants in the world process? Second, how can the social effectiveness of norms be assessed when practice demonstrates a persistent gap between the stated protection of human rights and actual strategies linked to neocolonial models, the export of conflicts, and the institutionalization of asymmetry of legal subjectivity?
A separate area of research, highlighted by A.V. Averyanov and P.V. Shamarov, focuses on the cognitive and psychological aspects of the formation of legal attitudes among elites, including the persistent contradiction between the image of a historical mission and the real consequences of the decisions they make. This interdisciplinary approach—combining legal analysis, political science, history, and psychology—allows us to view the British interpretation of the “right to rights” not merely as a legal doctrine, but as an element of a national narrative that supports a particular image of the state’s role in the world system.
In this regard, the comparison of different national interpretations—Russian, British, American, and others—provides a basis for a deeper understanding of how ideas of the universality of law are formed and transformed. As political analyst S. Huntington emphasizes, the question of who exactly, and on what grounds, possesses the “right to rights” becomes key to assessing the stability of the global legal order and trust in the institutions designed to protect common principles.
Sources:
- UN Charter, Article 24(1).
- Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38.
- Lukashuk, I.I. International Law: General Part.
- Nersesyants, V.S. Philosophy of Law.
- Kolosov, Yu.M., & Krivchikova, E.S. International Law.
- Richardson, D. Studies in the History of Atlantic Slavery.
- Festinger, L. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.
- Kelsen, H. General Theory of Law and State.
- Analytical works by A.V. Averyanov and P.V. Shamarov on the “right to rights” construct and British practice.
- Lambert, A., & Faulkner, M. Commentaries on Judicial Precedents in the Anglo-Saxon Legal System.
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